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A cut in the Department of Defense base budget to a level slightly below the historical average during a post conflict period with the National debt at record levels seems very reasonable and almost inevitable, yet they will still present significant challenges to those responsible for the Title 10 tasks of train, man, and equip. The budget control act combined with sequestration cuts will represent a 12. In order to survive these imminent challenges, critical decisions at the strategic level of acquisition are necessary to ensure services continue to meet the Title 10 responsibilities to train, man, and equip. The three areas that must be addressed are:
readiness of current equipment on hand, the requirements approval process for future acquisitions, and the acquisition process.
Readiness
In the 10 years since September 11, 2001 , the military has procured over $1.1
Trillion worth of equipment, 13 changing the way a soldier is equipped on the battlefield. Equipment worn in 2010 by the same Marine cost $7,180. 14 The 600 percent increase in cost is not an example of reckless spending, but rather a depiction of the increased reliance on improved technologies in order to accomplish complex missions.
The demands for capability improvements while engaged in combat operations requires the acquisition community to respond not only with better technology, but at a much faster pace than a traditional acquisition program that might field capability in 5-7
years. The traditional cycle of waiting two years for program funding, followed by a year of research and development, a year of testing, and multiple years of procurement does not respond fast enough to the demand of the warfighter engaged in combat with a need for a capability that will enhance mission success, or save lives. SECNAVINST 5000.2E (SECNAVINST 5000 is the Department of the Navy implementation of the DoD 5000 and the CJCS 3170) establishes procedures to respond to warfighting needs via the Urgent Needs Process (UNP).
An urgent need is an exceptional request from a Navy of Marine Corps component for an additional warfighting capability critically needed by operating forces conducting combat or contingency operations. Failure to deliver the capability requested is likely to result in the inability of units to accomplish their missions or increase the probability of causalities and loss of life. The advocate would prioritize this capability against available funding. For each program, a decision must be made to retain, attrit, or divest. For all programs identified for retention, resources must be allocated to address all the risk assumed in fielding and out year funding for sustainment must be programmed into the base budget. For programs identified to attrit, operating forces must be informed that as systems fail, they will be taken out of the inventory. For systems no longer being employed, funding must be provided for storage of systems. For capabilities identified for divestment, resources must be made available to item managers to dispose, de-mill, or sell via foreign military sales so that no future cost will be incurred for these items. This reconciliation is critical in order to determine base funding requirements before investment in future capability.
Requirements
The challenges for the Service Chiefs to train, man and equip the force become more complex in an environment of constrained resources. Investment dollars become extremely limited and critical strategic thinking is required to equip the force for tomorrow's conflict. In order to focus resource allocation decisions while also realizing the greatest potential synergy across services, the Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS) was established. 24 The purpose of the JCIDS process is to "identify the capabilities required by the warfighter to support the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the National Strategy for Homeland Programs like MRAP, and many other urgent programs succeeded because levels in the bureaucracy that traditionally had the authority to say no, but not the authority to say yes, were removed from execution. President Reagan's National Security Decision Directive 219 directs this simplicity by limiting the structure of the organization, yet methodical sequential mandated processes imposed by the 5000 series directives limit the potential for creative rapid solutions to valid requirements.
The next phase of acquisition reform should focus on the basic fundamental of an accountable AE, PEO, and PM. Empower these individuals to execute creative solutions while holding them accountable for cost, schedule, and performance. PMs should not be allowed to "hand off" a program once the item is fielded, but instead remain accountable for all facets of the program until the item is removed from service and properly disposed of. Holding PMs accountable until an item is disposed of will require continued engagement, especially for items procured in support of an urgent need where significant risk was accepted in support of rapid fielding.
Reconciliation of all systems procured under urgent requirements, integration of these capabilities into core funding with completed provisioning efforts, systems operational testing where required, and delegated authority along with accountability to program managers is the critical first step. These actions will preserve the capabilities growth of the U.S. military over the past 10 years for critical capabilities, and sets the stage for accurate estimates for future investment during times of constrained resources.
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